

Gossamer:

Securely Measuring Password-based Logins

Marina Sanusi Bohuk, Mazharul Islam, Suleman Ahmad,
Michael Swift, Thomas Ristenpart, Rahul Chatterjee




**CORNELL
TECH**



THE UNIVERSITY
of
WISCONSIN
MADISON

Modern Authentication Systems



Is hash(password) in the database?


Passwords are no longer sufficient!

Credential stuffing is a huge source of account compromise.


How do we separate benign and malicious traffic?

How do we safely log information about actual passwords?


Logging Password-Derived Measurements



Architecture




Architecture



If compromised, how could attackers use password-derived measurements to speed up attacks?

- Design principles**
1. Safe-on-reboot (Miklas '09)
 2. Periodic deletion
 3. Least privilege access
 4. Bounded leakage logging



How can we choose safe measurements to log?



Guess list
Gossamer logs
(Encrypted) username

Sends guess

Attacker guess list

Guess rank	Password
1	qwerty
2	abc123
3	hunter
4	jessica
5	spider

5 guesses

Gossamer logs

Encrypted username	zxcvbn score
0lVB5TH	2
gk3pPhL	1
trZQA1L	3
jNKR3Yp	2
OXJFw2r	4

How can we choose safe measurements to log?



Guess list
Gossamer logs
(Encrypted) username

Sends guess

LOGIN

marina

qwerty

LOGIN

Attacker guess list

Guess rank	Password	zxcvbn score
1	qwerty	1
2	abc123	0
3	hunter	4
4	jessica	2
5	spider	3

1 guess

Gossamer logs

Encrypted username	zxcvbn score
0lVB5TH	2
gk3pPhL	1
trZQA1L	3
jNKR3Yp	2
OXJFw2r	4

How can we choose safe measurements to log?

Dataset: 307 million breached passwords

Attacker's guess list: 80% split


Target passwords: 10k passwords sampled from remaining 20%

Problem: Original zxcvbn score leaks too much information!

Solution: Bucketize score to [0, 1]




Bounded leakage logging



Deploying Gossamer

Observed some high-volume attacks




Obtained approval from respective IRB and the IT offices.

Collected **34M** total login requests

Login friction is still high

Typos are frequent

Over 1 in 3 failed requests at U1 were typos. Even more for mobile logins.



Retries are common

● ● ● ● ● 1/5 at U1
● ● ● 1/3 at U2
eventually successful sessions required **more than one attempt.**

2FA impedes usability

Duo adds an average of **14 seconds** to a user's login.



Password managers could help...

About 25% of users use password managers.

LastPass...



1Password

Breached credential use is a problem.

23 U1 users and 254 U2 users were using a **breached password**.

Over 2K U1 users and 1K U2 users were using a **tweaked breached password**

marina123 → marina1234
breached password tweaked password

The high-volume attacks had **high fractions** of breached passwords.

Solution: Proactive breach alerting

Thomas et al. 2019, Li et al. 2019, Pal et al. 2022

Next: Investigate how to detect attacks better using these measurements

Gossamer

Safely record information about submitted passwords

- Bounded leakage logging
- Assess risk; reduce granularity

Extend with additional measurements

- Simulate improvement in attack

Gain insight into user and attacker behavior

- Can inform new policies
- Develop countermeasures

<https://cs.cornell.edu/~marina/gossamer>

Marina Bohuk | marina@cs.cornell.edu

Mazharul Islam | mislam9@wisc.edu